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Social Unrest in the UK and Turkey:
Rethinking Police Violence against Dissident Communities 
Abstract
The present study explores police violence during the riots in London and Gezi Park protests
in Istanbul. This study puts forth that the rise of social injustice in the UK and the erosion of
plural democracy in Turkey clarify the paradox of state intervention because the two states
prioritized rapid repression of uprising without consolidating public trust and social justice in
the society. This comparative study reveals that the liberal and non-religious elements of the
capitalist  ruling  system  in  the  UK  contains  similar  fractions  of  state  repression  when
compared to the authoritarian and religious elements of capitalist ruling system in Turkey. We
conclude that police violence endures the social control of dissident communities while it
maintains  the  sustainability  of  different  capitalist  ruling  systems in  the  periods  of  social
unrest.
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1 Introduction
Riots  and social  protests  unveil  collective  dissent  in  different  political  geographies.  This
unsurprising  outcome  provides  a  social  context  to  compare  and  clarify  the  relationship
between the form of dissent and the response of governments to the dissident communities.
Recent riots and social protests in London and Istanbul provoke a number of challenging
questions concerning the rule of law and social control in different political geographies. The
dissident communities perceive that social or political systems are failed or not functioning
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well. However, the persistence in preserving the status quo or reluctance to implement radical
changes in the ruling system enforces different states to maintain social control through using
law enforcement and sometimes applying excessive force.
The repression of riots and social protests has been studied extensively both by the
social movement and policing scholars (Barkan 1984; Opp and Wolfgang 1990; della Porta
1995; Koopmans 1997; Earl 2003; della Porta and Reiter 1998; Early, Sarah and McCarthy
2003; Merey 2004; Boudreau 2004; Carey 2006; Fernandez 2008; Rafail 2010). However, it
has been suggested that the role of capitalism is often ignored in social movement studies
(Hetland and Goodwin 2013; Fuchs 2014; della Porta 2015). The comparison of riots and
social protests has not been fully uncovered when we take in account both its violent/peaceful
character and police violence as independent variables to explore different ruling regimes of
capitalist order. The liberal regime in the UK and the authoritarian regime in Turkey put these
two countries into the broader cluster of capitalist order in which capitalist system influences
main economic structure similarly in both countries whereas the two countries have quite
different  political  characters  in  terms  of  the  recognition  of  liberties.  The  two  countries
suppress dissident communities without developing nonviolent interventions to tackle and
eliminate the principal reason of uprising among the same dissident communities. In fact, the
development  of  such non-violent  interventions  poses  certain  risks  to  the  main  pillars  of
capitalist  order  because  of  the  concentration  of  wealth  at  the  top, the  lack  of  radical
incrementalism, and the influence of neoliberalism as a principal ruling logic (Piketty 2014;
Schram 2015). To this end, this present study compares the London riots in 2011 with the
Gezi  Park protests  in Istanbul  in  2013 in order to  explore the social  unrest  in these two
countries, through engaging with fundamental concepts determining the character of social
unrest  such  as  “police  violence”,  “social  control”,  “rule  of  law”  and  “voice  and
accountability”.
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Taking “police violence” and “capitalist order” as independent variables, while the
score of “the rule of law” and “voice and accountability” as dependent variables in a liberal
regime of the UK and authoritarian regime of Turkey, we aim to explore how police violence
fosters the surge of social unrest and stimulates mass mobilization through social protests and
riots in London and Istanbul. We argue that police violence plays a leading role in the surge
of social unrest and mobilization when the dissident groups perceive police behavior or state
policies unjust, undemocratic and discriminative. This is not a surprising fact. However, our
study suggests that police violence can become so prevalent that it has certain commonalities,
irrespective of the scores of “rule of law” and “voice and accountability” of each country. We
assert that police misconduct was the concern of protestors so those social protests rapidly
transformed into violent riots in London, despite the UK having high scores of “rule of law”
and “voice and accountability”. As a result, the authoritarian and liberal regimes of capitalism
function similarly when it comes to the suppression of dissident communities. On the other
hand, we also note that the method of policing the social protests is an important indication to
distinguish the liberal and authoritarian governing models of capitalist order. In this context,
we claim that the use of police violence to suppress the peaceful protests appears as a focal
method of an authoritarian capitalist order as evidenced by the Gezi Park protests whereas
excessive police force and police misconduct are less common in a liberal regime compared
to the authoritarian regime. Our second argument centralizes the role of capitalism, claiming
that the liberal and non-religious elements of capitalist ruling system in the UK reveal similar
fractions of state repression when compared with the authoritarian and religious elements of
capitalist ruling system in Turkey. This deduction takes us to the next argumentation: Police
violence functions as a strong instrument to suppress the uprising while maintaining social
control in contentious societies and sustaining different capitalist ruling systems.
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We divide the remaining part of the paper into five sections. First, we introduce our
theoretical framework with a critical review of the literature, which concerns the relationship
between the rule of law, social protests and police violence in a capitalist order. Second, we
present  the  methods that  we used in  this  study.  Third,  we briefly  narrate  the  two social
protests and riots in London and Istanbul separately. Fourth, we compare the London riots
and Gezi Park protests. Before the conclusion, we discuss the results of the rule of law and
voice and accountability scores in these two countries and reconsider it within the places of
social protest and riots in a liberal and authoritarian regime of capitalist order. We conclude
with our final remarks, limitations of the present study and opportunities for future research.
2 Rule of Law and Social Control in a Capitalist Order
The rule of law concept has been a central  issue in the socio-legal discussions related to
public order throughout history starting from the discourses of Aristotle to the systematic
development of this concept in the nineteenth century by the British lawyer A.V. Dicey, who
argued that “the rule of law is associated with rights-based liberalism and judicial review of
governmental actions” (Fallon 1997: 1). That said, the “support for the rule of law is not
exclusive to the West. It has been endorsed by government heads from a range of societies,
cultures,  and economic and political  systems” (Tamanaha 2000:  2).  However,  the crucial
question comes to the fore when we ask that what form of law should rule the polity and
society? This question gains more importance in the contemporary world, where democracy
and the control of means of production play a vital role in the regulation of social, political,
and cultural life. The Secretary-General of the United Nations (UNSC 2004: 4) defined the
rule of law as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public
and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
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human rights norms and standards”. The rule of law is a fundamental basis for all liberal
constitutions (Peacock 2009). This evolution in the definition of rule of law makes it not
solely a systematic review of legal procedures, but a landmark enroute to consolidate social
justice and a culture of lawfulness. O’Donnell (2004: 32) echoed this point similarly, arguing
that “the role of law is among the essential pillars of upon which any high-quality democracy
rests”.  Nevertheless,  a  lawful  society  can  be  based  on an  unjust  system in  terms  of  the
distribution  of  social,  economic  and  political  power.  The  rule  of  law,  therefore,  cannot
function solely as criterion to guarantee social justice and democratic pluralism under every
condition of different governing models.
The content of law does, however, matter more than how the law system functions in
a social  and political  regime. As a result,  the rule of law cannot be the only standard to
establish an equal, peaceful, democratic, and just society. The capitalist order in the UK offers
a liberal regime where the citizens of the country are free in terms of civil liberties, which
signify freedom from (i) torture; (ii) freedom from forced disappearance; (iii)  freedom of
conscience; (iv) freedom of press; (v) freedom of religion; (vi) freedom of expression; and
(vii)  freedom of assembly.  On the other hand, social  injustice and poverty are evident in
certain regions throughout the UK, while certain groups (such as Gypsies, Roma, homeless
people, and people with learning disabilities, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers) remain
socially disadvantaged (Equality and Human Rights Commission report published 2016). In
addition, the same report also puts forth that social and economic perniciously affect Black
and ethnic minority communities. A liberal country governed by a capitalist order extends the
socially disadvantaged communities and marginalize them by the legal system through either
or both imprisonment and social exclusion. It is, thus, not surprising that “one in six of all
households in the UK are excluded from social norms due to poverty, and are poor in at least
two out of three ways of assessing poverty…in the UK more people are imprisoned, when
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measured both absolutely and relatively, than in any other country in Europe” (Dorling 2011:
6). The liberal regime in terms of guaranteeing the political and civil rights of citizens may
ironically limit their social rights in a capitalist order when these rights pose certain risks to
the ruling regime. This dilemma, in fact, is one of the main pillars of neoliberal capitalist
system and functions similarly one way or another in diverse geographies where a number of
countries in the West are conventionally categorized as “advanced democracies” based on
human  development  indices  and  political  regimes,  while  the  socially  disadvantaged
communities in these countries find themselves being trapped through marginalization and
criminalization.
Civil  rights  given  to  the  citizens  make  a  capitalist  country  liberal,  whereas  the
limitation of those rights render another country authoritarian. As such, Turkey’s rule under
the governance of Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has increased curbing the civil
rights  that  eventually  produced  an  electoral  authoritarianism  having  a  strong  Islamic
character (Ozbudun 2014; Tugal 2016). The ruling AK Party regime diminished the secular
sensibilities  of  the country  and created  a  new form of  capitalism largely due to  its  own
Muslim business network (Bugra and Savaskan 2014). This division between the religious
and secular class polarised Turkish society through neoliberal policies of the new capitalist
order  where  the power shift  from secular  to  Islamist  class  has  been a  determining force
(Balkan and Oncu, 2015). The capitalist property relations have been consolidated in the last
decades  in  new  Turkey  (Duzgun  2012).  However,  this  consolidation  cannot  be  directly
associated with the marriage of liberal democracy and capitalism. Inversely, the country has
drifted towards authoritarian Islam in the last few years, undermining pluralist democracy by
legitimizing majoritarian democracy as the ruling code of a new capitalist regime supported
by  a  popular  vote.  Yet  any  such  democracy  in  a  capitalist  order,  whether  liberal  or
authoritarian, also depends on the management of critical moments in which public panic
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prevails and the escalation of violence dominates the public sphere. In this context, police
violence appears  as  the key social  control  method in riots  and social  protests.  Exploring
police violence, thus, offers an opportunity to deconstruct the persistence of different political
regimes in a capitalist order.
The difference between the rule of law and the rule by law demystifies the importance
of justice more clearly in a social and political conflict because the rule by law indicates
using law as an instrument to govern without binding the state (Peerenboom 2004). The rule
of law has a strong relationship with the principle and ethical concept of law; however, the
rule by law is more concerned with the organization and implementation of law.  Hence,
“what distinguishes them is not the nature of the law, whether it operates as a tool or as a
framework, but the power system to which they respond” (Maravall and Przeworski 2003: 3).
The rule  of  law plays a  critical  role  in  the times of social  conflict,  political  tension and
cultural polarization. Meyer (2004) argued that violence and disorder have the capacity to
change the outcome of protest as it gives certain reasons to the authorities to legitimize the
repression of social protests, which eventually decline in time. In a capitalist order, whether
liberal  or  authoritarian,  the  rule  by  law aims  to  defend the  rights  of  the  state  power  to
consolidate  the  ruling  regime.  This  is  argued  to  be  the  reason  that  suppressive  policing
methods against the uprising communities serve to accumulate the power of governments.
Police  violence,  therefore,  echoed in  London and Gezi  Park  similarly  to  consolidate  the
ruling regime without addressing the principal reason of uprising even after the complete
suppression of riots and social protests.
Interactional level in the police-crowd and police-community nexus is determinative
whether  the  protest  of  dissident  community  evolves  and  becomes  violent  or  it  remains
peaceful (Newburn 2016).  The police systematically use its force to control the dissident
groups who have formidable discontents about the social and political system. Hence, the
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violent character of the protest is dominant in such uprisings, which eventually target the
protestors  when  they  react  against  police  suppression.  The  London  riots  and  Gezi  Park
protests,  which are scrutinized in this  paper,  were not  the outcome of a  series of violent
attacks to gather and defy the police and state power systematically. Instead, we argue that if
the lethal shot by the police had not happened, the social protests and riots in London would
likely never have been occurred in such a critical and dramatic way. What is more, violence
was not the expected outcome in the start of the peaceful protests in Istanbul’s Gezi Park. Yet,
similar to the case of London, the legacy of state violence,  the anger and perceptions of
dissident  communities  -who  believed  that  they  have  been  exposed  to  systematic
discrimination by the law enforcement and political agencies for so long- transformed the
reaction against police into ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back scenarios’. 
The violent social control of state forces imposes precarity1 through police force and
violates the fundamental human rights of contentious communities. This tarnished image of
state forces and justice constitute the traumatic past of the marginalized communities in a
capitalist  order.  The commonalities  and diversifications  noted  above render  the  two case
studies landmark comparative examples, so as to unveil the relationship between the rule of
law and police violence during social protests and riots in a liberal and authoritarian order of
capitalism. 
3 Methods
Our reasoning for selection of the particular two cases is  related largely to our principal
research question. Our aim is to test the role of “rule of law” and “voice and accountability”
scores in the use of police violence in two capitalist social order that have different degree of
civil liberties and political systems. As such, we selected two countries -the UK and Turkey-
1 Precarity was first used by a Catholic monk, Léonce Crenier, to signify the essential element of poverty (Day 
1952). The meaning of precarity has been expanded to identify the exploitation of neo-capitalist system 
through insecure jobs, social exclusion, low pay and welfare cuts (see Hardt and Negri 2004; Mabrouki 2004).
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that recently suppressed riots and social protests violently. The UK has a high score of “rule
of law” and “voice and accountability” whereas Turkey has lower index scores in both of the
clusters. 
We used three principal methods in this research. The first one is a narrative inquiry,
which helped to contextualize the moment of police violence, the reaction of protestors and
the surge of riots  and social  protests.  The narration,  therefore,  was based on four factors
shaped the riots  and social  protests:  (i)  facts  related to the protests and riots  such as the
primary motive of mass mobilization; (ii) duration of protests and riots; (iii) total number of
arrests; (iv) total number of dead and injured people. After a separated narrative on the two
cases, we compared the London riots and Gezi Park protests based on eight criteria:  (i) the
type of ruling regime; (ii) the source of main dissent; (iii) main social control methods; (iv)
the situational aftermath of riots and social protests; (v) the level of harm to the private and
public goods; (vi) organizational capacity; (vii) the response of the government in addition to
law enforcement; and (viii) the role of different capitalist regimes in the surge of conflict.
The third method we used is the reapplication and presentation of data concerning the
score of “rule of law” and “voice and accountability” in the UK and Turkey. One of the main
purposes  of  this  study is  to  explore  the  relationship  between the  rule  of  law and police
violence in riots and social protests. For this reason, our primary data were derived from the
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project, as it is the only data source that has been
measuring different government indicators every year since 2002. “The WGI project reports
composite  indicators  of  six  dimensions  of  governance,  covering  over  200  countries  and
territories since 1996, and is updated annually. The six aggregate governance indicators are
based on hundreds of individual underlying variables from dozens of different data sources.
The source data underlying the WGI come from a large number of individual sources, and
reflect the views on governance of thousands of survey respondents and public, private, and
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NGO sector experts worldwide” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010: 20). We used the
data from five yearly intervals (i.e. 2004, 2009 and 2014) for both Turkey and the UK. In
addition to this data, we examined the latest data collection concerning the rule of law index
in 2015, which was conducted by World Justice Project. Such data is based on more than
100,000 household and expert  surveys measuring “how the rule of law is experienced in
practical, everyday situations by the general public worldwide” (WJP Rule of Law Index
2015). The rule of law index aims to capture “perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in  and abide by the rules of  society,  and in  particular  the quality  of  contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence.” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010: 4) The score for the rule of law is 0.46 for
Turkey and 0.78 for UK (World Justice Project 2015). Comparing to the other countries in the
world, Turkey ranks in the bottom quartile whereas the UK ranks in the top quartile in both
indices. In this respect, the latest data of World Justice Project also showed a very similar
result with the data that we derived from the Worldwide Governance Indicators and displayed
in Table 1.
Table 1:  “Voice and Accountability” and “Rule of Law” indicators for Turkey and United
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Number of Sources: Shows the number of individual sources on which the aggregate 
indicator is based. (Please see the appendix for the name of each source).
Government Score: Estimate of governance measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5. Higher 
values correspond to better governance.
Percentile Rank: Indicates rank of country among all countries in the world. 0 corresponds 
to lowest rank and 100 corresponds to highest rank. 
Standard Error: Captures the precision of the estimate of governance for each country. 
Lower values indicate more precision.
The social protests and riots create venues and collective actions that reveal the voice
of dissident groups (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Hence, the second data cluster, voice
and accountability, has a special importance in comparing the relationship between the score
of “rule of law” and “voice and accountability”. The index of “voice and accountability” is
composed of seven representative and twelve non-representative sources. The index aims to
measure “the perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a
free media” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010: 4). Even though the UK’s “rule of law”
and  “voice  and  accountability”  indicators  show  a  better  government  performance  than
Turkey. There are still certain problems that the country needs to overcome to make its score
better.  Nevertheless, the UK has a better  performance in both indicators than USA, Italy,
Spain, and France, other countries’ scores in “rule of law” and “voice and accountability”
better than the UK, such as Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Australia, and Canada.
These ratings indicate that the UK has a more liberal and democratic regime than Turkey
(and, indeed, for that matter than the USA, Spain and France. However, the rating of the UK
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still indicates that there are areas, which need improvement and its rating is worse than in
other parts of the world, such as Australia, Canada, and Scandinavia.
Yet we still need to decipher how different forms of dissent determined the violent
and peaceful  character  of  London riots  and Gezi  Park protests,  and how police violence
played a determining role in the expansion of social unrest in the liberal regime of the UK
and the authoritarian regime of Turkey. These explications also offer a relevant context to
compare the “rule of law” and “voice and accountability” indicators.
4 Police Violence and Mobilization in London Riots
The riots in London started on August 6, 2011, two days after the police had shot and killed
Mark Duggan, a 29-year old black man who was a resident of Tottenham in North London
(Riots in Tottenham 2011). The circumstances around the shooting were contested with the
Metropolitan Police, claiming that Duggan had acquired a handgun, which he was planning
to use in a criminal act. Nevertheless, friends and families of Duggan were not convinced by
these accounts (Mark Duggan 2015). In addition, the changing narrative and inconsistency in
the  Metropolitan  Police’s  account  over  the  death  of  Duggan defied  the  reliability  of  the
police’s accounts (The leading article 2011). These contested tactics and maneuvers of the
state  forces  frustrated  local  public  that  was  already  concerned  about  the  death  of  Mark
Duggan.  The  Independent  Police  Complaints  Commission  (a  government  agency  that
investigates police conduct in the UK) subsequently investigated the case of Duggan’s killing
(IPCC, Metropolitan Police Service 2012), and a public inquest returned a verdict that it was
a lawful killing (Dodd, 2014). Yet such an outcome was not sufficient to convince protesters
who had contrary views about the legitimacy of this killing. Therefore, two days after the
killing of Mark Duggan, the dissidents did not remain silent and asserted concern regarding
the prevalence of police misconduct. The unrest grew exponentially with the motto uttering
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that ‘there can be no peace without justice’ (Tottenham Riot 2011). Mark Wadsworth, a local
journalist familiar with the area, visited Tottenham shortly before the protests transformed
into  precarious  and  violent  riots  in  this  highly  contentious  area  of  north  London.  What
Wadsworth witnessed indicated an ongoing process of socioeconomic decline and cultural
marginalization of the neighborhood and community. He reported from the field: 
Stafford Scott, a campaigner on racial equality, said: “People say that things are
not the same here (in Tottenham) since 1985, that conditions are much better.
But they are just as bad in terms of the stopping and searching of Black youth
by the police, Black students thrown out of school and high unemployment.”
There are more than 50 people for each unfilled job, 10 per cent more people
claiming Jobseeker's  Allowance  this  year  than  last.  Unemployment  hits  the
youth hardest. A youth worker, Symeon Brown, said Haringey Council, the UK
local authority, had cut youth services by 75 per cent (Tottenham Riot 2011).
The death of Mark Duggan crystallized the dissent of local community that has been
marginalized  socio-economically  and  culturally  for  so  long.  The  social  decline  in  the
boroughs of London, in this case Tottenham, manifested itself through the violent reaction of
some groups within the local community. The fatal shooting by the police created emotional
solidarity among the violent participants of the riots. The socioeconomic vulnerability shaped
the perceptions of black youth concerning the discriminatory approach of the state forces
towards them. 
The family of Mark Duggan called for calm, but they also claimed that Duggan had
not fired at police before he was being shot (Holehouse 2011). The riots in London swiftly
spread to other cities from Leicester and Nottingham to Bristol and Manchester (England
Riots  2011).  The riots  in England lasted for five days before the police regained control
through using excessive force and the riots diminished on August 11, 2011. However, the
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outcome of social unrest was enormous and perturbing. Five people were killed. Dozens of
civilians and around two-hundred police officers were injured (England’s week of riots 2011).
Looting, assault, arson, and property damage were widespread (Moore 2011). The reason for
the  lootings  after  the  London  riots  was  lack  of  a  determined  objective  by  the  looters
(Treadwell et. al. 2012). However, apart from opportunist looters, the instigator of these riots
was clear; excessive police force amongst a community characterized by social inequality
which was to be repeated dramatically in the major cities of the country during the riots.
5 Police Violence and Mobilization in Gezi Park Protests, Istanbul
Different from the social unrest in London, the Gezi Park protests were organized by peaceful
groups until the decline of protests. The main reason was to raise their voice and discontent
over repressive and discriminatory political issues. The Gezi Park protests started on May 28,
2013  in  Istanbul  when  the  police  burned  the  tents  of  dozens  of  peaceful  environmental
activists who opposed the government plans to replace the Gezi Park, one of the few green
areas in the center of Istanbul, with an Ottoman-era military barracks including a mosque and
shopping mall  (Turkey Clashes  2013).  The religious and commercial  symbol were at  the
center of this plan that showed the happy marriage of Islamic politics with capitalism. The
level of police force against the peaceful protestors mobilized thousands of people around the
Gezi  Park  in  the  subsequent  days.  The  increasing  political  authority  of  the  Turkish
government  disguised  itself  through  a  ruthless  attempt  to  design  public  projects  without
considering  the  overall  benefits  to  the  public.  The  local  administrative  court  in  Istanbul
cancelled the project in mid-June 2013 by concluding that such benefits were not evident.2
The increasingly authoritarian policies of the ruling AK Party government were the dominant
leitmotivs in the mobilization of Gezi Park protests. Furthermore, the political authority of
the  pro-Islamic  government  seriously  engaged  in  defying  policies  to  weaken  the  secular
2 The Turkish Council of State reapproved the project again in July 2015.
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polity of the country by curbing political and civil rights and making these rights questionable
in the public sphere.  For instance,  shortly before the Gezi  Park protests,  the government
challenged  the  right  of  abortion  and  handed  a  suspended  10-month  prison  for  world-
renowned  Turkish  pianist  Fazil  Say  for  interpreting  his  claims  as  an  “insult  against  the
religious  belief  held  by  a  faction  of  society”  (Gurcan  and  Peker  2014).  The  Turkish
government also banned the sale of alcohol in shops between 22:00 and 06:00 and opposed
the proposal to extend the rights of LGBT community in the country (Gurcan and Peker
2014).  The Turkish media reported that the protests were  "drawing more than students and
intellectuals.  Families  with  children,  women  in  headscarves,  men  in  suits,  hipsters  in
sneakers, pharmacists, tea-house proprietors – all are taking to the streets to register their
displeasure" (Gezer and Popp 2013). The protestors in Gezi Park, as a result, achieved to
unify around one common reason, which was uprising for their democratic rights even though
the protestors were heterogeneous, coming from different social and cultural backgrounds. 
In  the  first  days  of  June  2013,  a  solidarity  group  was  established  to  represent  the
protestors,  which  is  called  Taksim Solidarity,  and  they  issued  fundamental  demands  for
conciliation and termination of the protests:
 the preservation of Gezi Park;
 an end to police violence, the right to freedom of assembly and the prosecution of
those responsible for the violence against demonstrators;
 an end to the sale of "public spaces, beaches, waters, forests, streams, parks and urban
symbols to private companies, large holdings and investors";
 the right of people to express their "needs and complaints without experiencing fear,
arrest or torture."
 for the media "whose professional duty is to protect the public good and relay correct
information ... to act in an ethical and professional way."
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 ruling authorities to realise that the reaction of the citizens is also about the third
airport in Istanbul, the third bridge over The Bosporus, the construction on  Atatürk
Forest Farm, and the hydro-electric power plants (HEPP) (Taksim Solidarity Press
Release 2013).
The government immediately rejected the proposal and embraced a more authoritarian
path  to  suppress  the  protests  in  the  following  days  by  using  police  force.  Amnesty
International reported that " the use of force by police is being driven not by the need to
respond to violence – of which there has been very little on the part of protesters – but by a
desire to prevent and discourage protest of any kind" (Amnesty International 2013a). By 14
June 150,000 tear gas cartridges and 3000 tons of water had been used (Eylemlerin Bilancosu
2013). The protests spread to other major cities of the country during the volatile summer.
The protests, however, demonstrated extensively a peaceful character. Violence only emerged
after the fierce police suppression and it was limited with the interactions between the police
and the protestors. Looting or plundering was not recorded. Yet the protests showed a decline
in the last week of August 2013. The increasing number of victims, causalities and extensive
fear  in  the public because of the police brutality  and imprisonment led to the decline of
protests  (Tugal  2013;  Gurcan  and  Peker  2015).  More  than  three  thousand  people  found
themselves imprisoned, while eleven protestors were killed and at least 8,163 were injured
(Amnesty International 2013b). 
6 The Rise of Social and Political Dissent: Marginalization in London Riots and Gezi
Park Protests
Comparing the London riots and Gezi Park protests, we detected eight criteria that reveal
both similar and diverse dimensions of the two cases (see Table 2). The ruling regime of the
two countries also shape the level of response against the riots and social  protests. Even
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though the main ruling economic ideology of the both countries is related to capitalism, when
examining  the  political  economic  structure,  the  UK is  traditionally  more  attached to  the
promotion  of  liberal  values  of  democratic  rights.  In  comparison,  Turkey  has  witnessed
deteriorating human rights record and increasing authoritarianism coupled with an erosion of
plural democracy particularly in the last decade. The political economic structure of the UK
allocates the country in the league of liberal democracy whereas Turkey takes its position in
the league of authoritarian democracy where certain liberties and free elections are available
under a regime curbing many rights, restricting the opposition, and eroding plural democracy.
Turkey, of course, is not alone in this league, as Russia, Malaysia, China, Azerbaijan, Iran,
and Venezuela show many similarities in terms of the limits on political freedom. Yet, what is
striking is that, despite these noted differences between the UK and Turkey, police violence
plays a similar role both in liberal and authoritarian democracies.
Table 2: Comparison of London riots and Gezi Park protests based on eight criteria
      
      LONDON RIOTS              GEZI PARK   PROTESTS
Type of ruling regime of the
country
Liberal democracy Authoritarian democracy
Source of main dissent Social dissent Political dissent
Main social control
methods
Police force, which is
occasionally violent, faulty
and excessive
Police force, which is mostly
violent, faulty, and excessive
The number of victimized
and arrested people in the
aftermath of the riots and
social protests
Low number of arrests and
casualty
High number of arrests and
casualty
Harm against the private
and public goods
Mostly violent/extensive
harm to the private and
public goods
Mostly peaceful/limited harm




riots with unclear demands
and inconsistent targets
United and well-organized
social protests with clear
demands and consistent targets
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The response of the
government in addition to
law enforcement
Some policies deployed,
but no serious methods to
tackle the source of social
dissent
No policies deployed by the
government. Inversely, a more
authoritarian path was
followed 
The role of different
capitalist regimes in the
surge of conflict
Marginalization of
communities in the social




communities in the political
sphere by authoritarian and
Islamic elements of capitalism
The source of a dominant motive in the two cases was more perplexing and related to
social  and  political  dissent  of  the  protestors  in  London  riots  and  Gezi  Park  protests
respectively. These two different forms of dissent –whether social or political dissent- were
already evident before the violence of police imposed itself as a central agency of conflict in
the two cases. Social dissent has often prevailed throughout history among the economically
declining, socially isolated and culturally discriminated communities. These vulnerabilities
played a role in the spread of protests and riots, with the protests and riots in London and
other cities of the country drawing in protestors from all ethnic groups. On the other hand,
different from the London case, the political dissent shaped the dominant motive, leading to
mass mobilization in the Gezi Park protests.
The peaceful protestors were confronted by extensive police violence, and many of
them were arrested. Police violence was also apparent in London; however, it  was not as
extensive as the Gezi Park protests. In addition, different from the violent and criminalized
character of the London riots, looting and property damage were not evident during the Gezi
Park protests. More to the point, the extensive police violence and higher number of arrests
suggest that an authoritarian order is more reactionary against peacefully organized social
protests,  which  aim  at  defying  the  power  of  their  ruling  regime.  When  considering  the
London riots, the embedded discrimination and socio-economic vulnerability were apparent
in the everyday lives of the disadvantageous groups that further fostered their marginalization
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through police violence. Thus, the death of black man in London opened a Pandora’s Box,
uncovering deep social inequalities in the country.
The number of arrested people,  casualties and economic damage also diversify as
these  numbers  are  lower  in  the  London  riots  than  the  Gezi  Park  protests.  While  police
violence played a major role in both cases. In the London riots, the police were occasionally
violent  and  at  fault  whereas  the  Gezi  Park  protests  were  prevalently  characterized  by
excessive  police  violence.  This  contradiction  shapes  the  reaction  of  the  law enforcement
against  the  dissident  and  uprising  communities  at  different  degrees  in  a  liberal  and  an
authoritarian democracy.
The cost of the London riots after the damage to the public and private good were
estimated around £100 million (Edmonds and Strickland 2015). The level of violence and
harm to the private and public good by the rioters and protestors was more grievous in the
London riots than the Gezi Park protests. The main reason in the surge of violence in the
London riots is also related to the diversity of population group who participated in the riots
in London and other English cities. Some of the rioters were angry, violent and aimed to
increase gains by materializing this social  chaos through looting.  Some protestors, whose
concerns were social deprivation, segregation, unjust policies of the government, and police
violence, could not make their voice heard as much as the outcome of violence deployed by
the looters. Therefore, the participants of the London riots became part of a heterogenous
group whose  demands  eroded  in  silence  after  the  termination  of  the  riot  because  of  the
dispersed and disorganized character of the social group in addition to violent rioters whose
aims were gaining material benefits from the riots. The same character of disunity partially
led  the  rioters  to  target  random  places  and  institutions  from  time  to  time.  Hence,  the
victimized and socially deprived group among the rioters lacked the sources to clarify their
demands and raise their voice effectively. On the other hand, a contradictory approach was
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embraced  by  many  participants  of  the  Gezi  Park  protests.  Shortly  after  the  violent  and
excessive police force in  the first  days of  suppression in  early June 2013,  the protestors
received an important moral support from the prominent social organizations in Turkey and
this followed the solidarity of popular singers and artists with the Gezi Park protestors. While
the protests were spreading to the other Turkish cities in the country, the peaceful and non-
violent resistance was the principal method of the participants. It is not surprising that the
participants united with the establishment of Taksim Solidarity to raise their voice under a
unified force with clear demands. The manifesto published by the Taksim Solidarity, that was
noted in the previous section, is a palpable example of it.  As a result,  Gezi Park protests
portrayed a  contradictory organizational  structure,  which had clear  goals,  demonstrated a
peaceful and organized character, which was open to dialogue and possessing clear aims. 
The response of law enforcement to a riot or social protest determines the destiny of
rioters and protestors. Yet, the same response also permits certain hints in detecting the role of
law enforcement and the capacity of developing government policies to address the concerns
of  rioters  and  protestors.  From  this  perspective,  neither  the  English  nor  the  Turkish
government  could  centralize  the  concerns  of  the  rioters  and  protestors  while  devising
responses both during and aftermath of the riots and social protests. This missed opportunity
led both governments to prioritize rapid and violent suppression of the riots and protests. In
July  2013,  the  British  government  published  Government  Response  to  the  Riots,
Communities and Victims Panel’s final report and rejected the argument that “poverty, race
and the challenging economy” cannot be the excuses for the “appalling behavior” for the riots
in August 2011 (Government Response to the Riots 2013: 15). The same report presents the
implemented policies by the government since the riots and these policies are mainly limited
to the reforms in policing and justice system. The rejection of growing social injustice and the
police  violence  against  the  dissident  communities  by  the  British  government  reflect  the
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conservative state position that is unable to grasp the principal social problem in the surge of
conflict. Similarly, the Turkish government rejected the manifesto of the Taksim Square and
did not abolish the project to construct both a mosque and a shopping mall. What is more, an
unyielding campaign was initiated by the pro-government media outlets to delegitimize the
protestors  (Koca-Helvaci  2016).  The  London  riots  and  Gezi  Park  protests  unravel  the
misleading priority of law makers from both country whose decisions prompted the decline
of social peace and equality in the society.  
The comparison of London riots and Gezi Park protests clarify that the rise of social
dissent and political dissent depends upon eight factors: (i) the type of ruling regime; (ii) the
source of main dissent; (iii) main social control methods; (iv) the number of arrested people
and victims of the aftermath of riots and social protests; (v) the level of harm to the private
and public goods; (vi) organizational capacity of riots/social protests; (vii) the response of the
government in addition to law enforcement; and (viii) the role of different capitalist regimes
in the surge of conflict. The first seven factors explicate our first main argument asserting that
the two states prioritized rapid repression of uprising by excessive police force, which was
violent and excessive to different degrees, over the consolidation of trust, peace, and equality
in the society. The same method of police repression also elucidates the paradox of state
repression, which eliminates the riot and social protest for a certain period of time through
law enforcement without dealing with the principal factors creating the social and political
dissent. So far, we have presented those first seven factors when comparing the London riots
and Gezi Park protests. The eighth factor will now be next discussed.
7 Police Violence in either Liberal or Authoritarian Capitalist Orders 
The fundamental commonality of the two social protests and riots discussed in the paper lies
in the role of police violence in two capitalist orders that either fostered mass mobilization (as
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happened in  London)  or  transformed  a  relatively  small  group of  protestors  into  massive
dissident groups as happened in the Gezi Park protests). However, police violence is not the
only reason of mass mobilization, yet it is a stimulating force that concretizes deep social and
political problems in these two countries. 
Repression, as Tilly (1978: 100) argued, signifies “any action by another group which
raises the contender’s cost of collective action”. Emotions are strong auxiliary forces in this
solidarity that provide motivation and determine the goal for social protests. Yet repression
against collective action is not limited to certain marginalized groups in different political
regimes.  “If  faced with popular  dissent,  democracies were just  as likely to  respond with
negative  sanctions  as  other  regime  types,  whereas  negative  sanctions  were  particularly
unsuccessful to solicit dissident cooperation in democracies” (Carey 2006: 1). Various forms
of  dissent  and its  methods  of  social  control  during  the  social  protests  and  riots  test  the
strength of democracies, voice and accountability. Gilham and Marx (2000: 234) analyzed the
Seattle social protests, claiming that complex violent social settings produce certain ironies in
which  protestors  and  the  police  are  the  facilitators  of  this  irony,  and  concluded  that
“authoritarian societies are defined by order without liberty.  But democratic societies can
only exist with both liberty and order.” Yet the consolidation of liberty and order guarantees
neither social justice nor a sustainable peace in a capitalist order. The London riots depicts
how the liberal regime in the UK created social  unrest and suppressed it with the use of
police force to reconsolidate the social order. The reconsolidation of social order does not
guarantee the resolution of social conflict, but the eradication of social dissent and physical
violence in the public space. The increasing gap between the rich and the poor, the rife of
poverty, modern slavery, and discrimination in the work space continue to be the major social
problems in the UK for particular groups. 
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Elsewhere in countries, where capitalism has played little or no role, police repression
has been frequently to suppress the social or political dissent. For example, in Lenin’s ruling
regime,  “Soviet  citizens  at  all  levels  of  society  were  subject  to  intense  secret  police
surveillance and were constantly subject to possible arrest for real or imagined infractions”
(Skocpol 1979: 230). The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 in China brought the brutal
state repression against the protestors who strove for the elimination of corruption in the
Communist Party and the recognition of fundamental freedoms (Lim 2014). From this point
of view, what makes police violence in a capitalist society distinctive than a non-capitalist
society is blurry at the first instance. Both capitalist and non-capitalist state forces use law
enforcement  to  preserve  the  status  quo  against  the  dissident  communities.  In  fact,  such
commonalities are more than the distinctions between a capitalist and non-capitalist society
regarding the control of power and the consolidation of its authority in contentious times.
However, the comparison in this present study reveals another overlooked issue regarding the
similarities and differences between a liberal and authoritarian ruling system of capitalism.
Hence, comparing the riots and social protests in the UK and Turkey, we have found that
capitalism conceals the main social problem while hindering the design of relevant policies to
overcome the social dissent in a liberal ruling regime as it occurred in the London riots. On
the other hand, capitalism in an authoritarian regime leads to more critical outcomes because
not only does police violence apply suppression, but also those capitalist policies designed by
the government are implemented against the furious objection of politically dissident groups,
who show their reaction against these projects through peaceful protests. The liberal policies
neglecting the social justice eventually made the police force the guardians of the regime to
defend it  against  the contentious communities. Different from the Gezi Park protests,  the
reactionary communities were not ideologically polarized, and religion was not a motivating
factor in the surge of London riots. Therefore, the liberal and non-religious elements of the
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capitalist  ruling  system in  the  UK  reveal  similar  fractions  of  state  repression  when  we
compare it with the authoritarian and religious elements of capitalist ruling system in Turkey.
Yet the main difference appears in the degree of police violence and police misconduct. The
liberal regime still  does not have a good record on accountability of policing methods in
terms of excessive force. Nevertheless, torture or systematic violence against the dissident
communities are not as common as in authoritarian regimes (Iadicola and Shupe 2003: 267).
Yet in both cases police violence is an effective instrument, which endures the social control
of  dissident  communities  on  one  hand  while  maintaining  the  sustainability  of  different
capitalist ruling systems on the other. The decline of the riots and social protests in London
and Istanbul after the rapid police repression is an indication that clarifies the effectiveness of
law enforcement in the preservation of status quo.
 Returning to  our  comparison in  the  use  of  police  violence  by  the  two capitalist
countries with different ruling systems, we identify that police violence is still the main pillar
of social control independent of political regime of a country. However, the level of police
violence  and  police  misconduct  demonstrate  differences  in  a  liberal  and  authoritarian
capitalist ruling system. The London riots show that police violence and police misconduct
were less grievous than the Gezi Park protests, even though the protestors in the Gezi Park
were mostly peaceful. Capitalism creates new opportunities for the government in a liberal
regime by concealing the principal problem. A focus solely upon criminal actions of rioters
during riots and public violence ironically allows the government in the U.K. to overlook the
probable causational roots of its main social problems, which are based in the dysfunctional
system of growing social inequality and social injustice. The main problem began with the
social  dissent among the rioters and that same social  dissent  transformed the riots  into a
perilous threat against  the public order. The recommended response to tackle such public
discord requires the designing of social programs that outreach those living in poverty and
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deprived regions that have been adversely influenced by the ravages of capitalism. The UK
report, noted in the previous section, was prepared by the government after the decline of
riots, and it blamed the rioters who deployed violence. However, such a response overlooks
those nonviolent protesting groups who raised their concerns regarding social injustice, but
their concerns did not find adequate place in the same report. Designing public policies that
address the needs of the uprising dissident communities signify a fundamental change in the
core principles of a capitalist economy. Such a radical shift is not on the agenda of the UK
government. This contradiction explains the role of a liberal capitalist ruling system in the
concealment  of  the  main  social  problem  and  the  suppression  of  dissident  communities
through law enforcement. 
With regard to Turkey, the increasing political authority, the surging role of Islam in
social and cultural life, and the initiatives of AK Party government have combined to create
an obedient and pious generation in Turkey. This threatening combination has played a major
role in mass mobilization of the mostly secular, modern, and young generation who believed
that  their  life  style  was  under  risk  of  elimination.  The destruction  of  Gezi  Park without
considering the environmental concerns of protestors regarding the construction of a mosque,
a  residential  area,  and a  shopping mall  explains  the mutual  relationship  between Islamic
capitalism and authoritarian ruling regime. While in the UK case study, capitalism concealed
the main social problem; in the Turkish case, capitalism played a more explicit role with
shaping the economic landscape through the Islamic social networks and public contracts.
The  violent  suppression  of  the  protests  prompted  a  discernible  rise  of  an  authoritarian
capitalist landscape, colored by both conservative and Islamic groups. The strong religious
basis of such an authoritarian capitalist order enticed those who are part of the social network
within conservative Islamic trade unions to take the major share from the public contracts, so
they benefited from the privatization policies and government-private sector cooperation. It is
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not coincidental  that the entire project to construct a mosque in one of the most popular
squares of the city merged with the construction of a shopping mall and a residential area.
The destruction of a park unveils a long-term plan, which aims to create a conservative and
Islamic society, while transforming the control of economy through shifting the power from a
secular to a more religious group that is affiliated with the ruling party.
If a riot or social protest has violent outcomes, the capitalist oriented principles of
state forces, whether liberal or authoritarian, impose interventionist repression through police
force without addressing the main dissent of the uprising communities. As a result, there is no
difference between the liberal and authoritarian ruling systems of capitalism in their approach
to tackle the main social and political  problem that incited uprisings. The apathy of both
governments to address the social and political dissent categorizes the two countries in the
same cluster. Yet one of the most important difference is the level of reaction of police force,
which was  occasionally excessive and flawed in the London riots; however, it was  mostly
excessive and flawed in the Gezi Park protests. In addition,  the role of capitalism is still
important but more elusive in a liberal ruling regime, whereas the Turkish case study reveals
that capitalism plays an active role in an authoritarian regime by increasing the wealth of the
political  networks  and  directly  shaping  the  contemporary  economic  programs  with  the
suppression of political dissent.
Turning to the results of our data in Table 1, there is a gap in terms of “voice and
accountability”  and “rule  of  law” scores  between the  two countries.  Turkish government
performs poorly in the “voice and accountability” and the “rule of law” scores, whereas the
UK has good government scores in both of these clusters. The diminishing performance of
the Turkish government in the “rule of law” score in the 2009 and 2014 index is also worth
noting that decreased from 0.13 to 0.10 in 2009 and continued deteriorating in the 2014 index
with a score of 0.04. The Gezi Park case portrays a different social and political landscape in
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which  the  authoritarian  Turkish  government  leveraged  public  panic  strategically  and
suppressed the peaceful and non-violent protestors. Nevertheless, the two cases clarify that
the method of police reaction is an important instrument in a capitalist order that leads both to
the surge of social unrest and the control of it by physical force. In doing so, the undermined
power of the dissident groups is demotivated to protest again at least for a certain period of
time. Police violence may elucidate social vulnerabilities and undemocratic governance in
these two countries that have different scores relating to “voice and accountability” and the
“rule of law”. The London riots are the poignant examples of this elucidation and make the
country’s high scores unremarkable in the prevention of riots and their governance. The high
scores of “voice and accountability” and “rule of law” manifest only a general picture of the
political,  social  and  legal  landscape  in  a  country.  We  argue  that  these  high  scores  are
insufficient to address the principal motives that marginalize and discriminate certain groups
and  minorities  in  a  liberal  capitalist  order.  More  alarmingly,  these  scores  raise  a  vital
methodological concern as it neglects and undermines the social and political marginalization
of disadvantageous groups. 
The protestors may pose certain risks against authoritarian governments. These risks
against  the  authoritarian  capitalist  order  prompt  the  implementation  of  repressive  law
enforcement policies in such countries. The Gezi Park protests are typical examples revealing
the repressive facets of governing cadre in an authoritarian capitalist order. The comparison
of London and Gezi Park cases manifests that both liberal and authoritarian capitalist orders
create dissident communities uprising for different reasons, but being suppressed similarly
through police force. 
The commonalities between the London and Gezi Park cases are remarkable when
police violence increased social unrest in both instances. The comparison of the two cases
questions the high score of “rule of law” and “voice and accountability” of the UK. This
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deduction takes us to our next claim that the places and the times of social protest and riot
need to be re-explored and compared so as to distinguish the role of different social and
political orders in a micro-space and time period. The content of this claim highlights that the
moments of social crisis and the areas of collective uprising offer the opportunity of revealing
unequal distribution of power and mis-governance of justice in a capitalist order, regardless
as to, whether it is liberal or authoritarian. Moreover, police violence in the London case
indicates that the state reaction against dissident groups festers where violence is endemic for
a certain group of people whose life conditions are characterized by social inequality and
social  exclusion.  By  the  same  token,  the  high  scores  of  “rule  of  law”  and  “voice  and
accountability” lose their importance concerning the credibility of a liberal capitalist order
which marginalizes and excludes socioeconomically disadvantageous groups. 
8 Concluding Remarks
This comparative study of police violence in riots and social protests has sought to clarify
how police violence gives impetus to social unrest and becomes an effective social control
method in a liberal and authoritarian capitalist order. Yet the most critical outcome is that
reaction of law enforcement unveils social inequality and undemocratic governance both in
the UK and Turkey. Perceptions of police misconduct, particularly among the members of
socially disadvantaged and culturally marginalized communities, make the mechanism that
functionalizes the rule of law appear ineffective and discriminatory for these groups as it is
delineated  in  the  case  of  UK  through  the  London  riots.  Conversely,  the  authoritarian
governments,  having a  low score of  “rule  of  law”,  followed a more  reactionary  path by
extending the use of violence even against those peaceful protestors. Such a repressive social
control method does not only elucidate the fragility of governing models in a capitalist order,
but  also  elucidates  that  the  governing  cadre  of  a  capitalist  order,  whether  liberal  or
authoritarian, embracing similar social control methods through using law enforcement and
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police  repression.  In  this  context,  police  violence  in  the  present  study  emerges  as  an
important indicator to test the reaction of two different capitalist orders and the role of rule of
law where social protests and riots occur. The present study, therefore, highlights that neither
the “rule of law” score nor the” voice and accountability” score are sufficient to detect social
and democratic  justice  in  the  places  of  social  protests  and riots  where  the  marginalized,
disadvantaged and dejected communities live in and react against the ruling power because of
the perceived injustice.
We aimed to shed new light on the relationship between the rule of law and social
protests  in  which  police  violence  played  a  concerted  role  in  a  liberal  and  authoritarian
capitalist order. Yet the present study has certain limitations such as the lack of ethnographic
research after the riots and social protests ceased. The results of our study, nevertheless, bring
two new questions regarding (i) how the consolidation of liberal and authoritarian capitalist
order evolves without tackling the root of social and political dissent after the decline of riots
and protests; and (ii) how the perceptions of protestors, concerning their future, transform
after the decline of riots and social protests. While we could not devise a complete response
to these significant questions here, the present study’s finding may open up new ways as to
how to reconsider police violence through comparative lenses critically in different regime
types  of  capitalist  order.  We  may  also  develop  new  perspectives  to  conceive  the
anthropological dynamics of rule of law related to social and democratic justice, if a group of
researchers conduct comparative ethnographic research in diverse geographies as participant
observers. The protests of Global Justice Movement may provide good opportunities for such
a  research  in  which  there  is  a  high  probability  of  police  repression.  The  present  study
underlines that measuring the rule of law for the dissident communities in the places of riots
and social protests are more fundamental, rather than presenting a general picture concerning
the score of rule of law in a country. The rule of law must be to the service of all citizens in
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order to retain such important notions of democratic policing and ‘policing by consent’. More
importantly,  the rule  of law must be an auxiliary force to eliminate the source of social,
political  and  cultural  inequality  that  creates  great  dissent  and  vulnerabilities  among  the
marginalized, deprived and discriminated communities. Inversely, the two cases show that
law enforcement remains under the governance of capitalist order avoiding any serious risks
against social and democratic injustice. Thus, law enforcement empowers both liberal and
authoritarian forms of capitalist order similarly.
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